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I. INTRODUCTION
Ed Swaine's Article, Reserving,1 sheds new theoretical light on an old
and vexing question in international law: what rules should govern the
common practice of filing unilateral reservations to multilateral treaties? The
regulation of these unilateral opt-out devices has been a longstanding irritant
for international legal scholars. The default rules governing reservations in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are complex, ambiguous, and often
counterintuitive. And the practice of states-both those that reserve and those
that do not-is little better. States often bargain around the default rules by
negotiating treaty-specific risk management provisions (but frequently do
not). They sometimes object to plausibly treaty-incompatible reservations (but
just as often do not). And they sometimes allow treaty bodies to review the
validity of reservations (but they also challenge that authority, claiming for
themselves the sole power to judge their treaty partners' unilateral
statements).
In seeking to bring some order to this chaos, Swaine's Reserving makes
three important contributions. First, the Article offers an informative primer
on reservations-related lawmaking now underway in multiple venues. Swaine
carefully documents the initiatives by states and international law experts that
seek to optimize or at least marginally improve upon the existing rules
governing reservations. And he illustrates his points by drawing upon a broad
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1. Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307 (2006).
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array of treaty practice, including examples from human rights, the laws of
war, arms control, cybercrime, environmental protection, transnational
judicial procedure, diplomatic immunity, the law of the sea, and many others.
International lawyers who read Reserving will come away with a much richer
understanding of the many subtle legal issues embedded within the
international reservations regime.
Second, and far more significantly, Reserving brings the insights of law
and economics and rational choice to bear on the practice of unilateral
reservations. In doing so, it casts doubt upon the conventional wisdom that
reservations systematically benefit reserving states and disadvantage non-
reserving states. Challenging this widely held view, Swaine develops a
positive theory of non-reserving states' interests. He argues persuasively that
the ability to reserve enhances the depth and breath of treaty commitments for
all states and that the act of reserving reveals useful information about a
state's reputation and its propensity to comply with international law. Seen
from this perspective, reservations are not a necessary evil that states
grudgingly tolerate to secure broader treaty participation. They are, instead,
useful tools of treaty design that help to promote interstate cooperation.
Third, Reserving's focus on the law and practice of unilateral treaty opt-
outs fills a gap in a growing body of writing by scholars who use
interdisciplinary methods to analyze specific facets of the international legal
system. Recent books and articles in this vein have analyzed
2.-intergovernmental organizations, international courts and tribunals,3 soft law,
and a wide array of treaty "risk management tools,"' 4 including exit clauses,5
6 7escape clauses, membership rules, renegotiation and amendment
procedures, 8 use of framework conventions and protocols, and the
relationship between treaty form and substance.' Viewed collectively, these
works provide a more precise account of state interests in shaping legal rules
2. See, e.g., Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2005);
Laurence R. Heifer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and
Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2006); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Upson
& Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002); Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create international Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 899 (2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
4. See RIcHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, at ix-x
(1981).
5. Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005); Edward T. Swaine,
Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2003).
6. See Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Miner, The Optimal Design of International Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT'L ORG. 829 (2001).
7. See SCOTT BARRETr, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFt: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (2003); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
8. See Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCL
REV. 549 (2005).
9. See John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 193
(1999).
10. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579
(2005); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
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and institutions to achieve joint gains. With only a few exceptions, 1 however,
scholars employing interdisciplinary approaches have largely ignored the
issue of reservations.
In this Response, I offer three modest additions to Swaine's insightful
contribution to this literature. First, I apply his theory of state interests and
information to a dynamic model of reserving that takes account of temporal
issues such as when states file reservations and how treaty commitments
change over time. Second, I extend Reserving's analysis to the flexibility
devices that states employ when they preclude reservations or bargain around
the Vienna Convention's default rules. Third, I consider the relationships
between reservations and other treaty flexibility tools and explore the
consequences of those relationships for managing the risks of international
agreement.
II. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TREATY RESERVATIONS
The theory of state interests and information proffered in Reserving is
essentially static. It does not address when a state reserves relative to the date
of a treaty's conclusion or to earlier ratifications by other treaty parties. Nor
does the theory consider how reservations relate to treaties whose obligations
evolve over time in response to rulings by international tribunals or to changes
in the treaties' geostrategic environment. I explore these two aspects of a
dynamic model of reservations in the sections below.
A. A First Mover Disadvantage To Reserving?
First, it seems plausible that both the strategic benefits to reserving states
and the informational benefits to non-reserving states will vary over the
course of a treaty's life cycle. Consider the position of a reserving state that
ratifies a treaty immediately after the conclusion of the diplomatic conference
finalizing its text as compared to the position of a reserving state that ratifies
many years after the treaty has entered into force.
An early reserver signals that it is willing to cooperate, but only on its
own terms. This same message arguably attaches to any reservation. But early
reservations are likely to be especially strong indicia of non-cooperation,
inasmuch as they deviate from the final text that the parties have only just
finished negotiating. The reputational cost to reserving early may therefore be
considerable. 12
11. See Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96
AM. J. INr'L L. 531 (2002) [hereinafter Goodman, Human Rights Treaties]; Francesco Parisi & Catherine
9ev~enko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(i) of the Vienna Convention, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, The Hidden Bias of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (George Mason Univ. Law and Economics Working Paper 03-20,
2003), available at http://www.gmu.edulfaculty/papersldocslO3-20.pdf.
12. This is so even if the reserving state has participated in drafting the treaty and revealed
during the negotiations its propensity to reserve after the treaty's adoption. As Swaine correctly notes,
future threats of reserving made during negotiations are "cheap talk" relative to the later decision to file
a formal reservation. See Swaine, supra note 1, at 339-40.
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Conversely, the benefits to reserving states are diminished by the
disclosure of their position early in the ratification process. With each
subsequent ratification, another treaty party will have a fresh opportunity to
object to the reservation and, in extreme cases, to prevent the treaty from
entering into force between itself and the reserving state. In this way, early
reservations can remain legally at risk for many years, increasing uncertainty
for the reserving state while providing non-reserving states as a group with
greater latitude to manage the treaty's risks.
13
By contrast, late-ratifying states that file reservations are in a more
advantageous position relative to non-reserving states. They have at their
disposal a wealth of information about the reactions of existing treaty
members to previous reservations, including reservations that are similar or
identical to those the late-ratifying state wishes to make. This information is
likely to be particularly useful to the reserving state. It reveals whether one or
more non-reserving states have objected to earlier reservations, the identity of
the objecting states, the factual basis of their objections, and the strength of
their opposition (as manifested, for example, by whether the non-reserving
states deem that the treaty has not entered into force with respect to the
reserving state). If, as Swaine argues, non-reserving states benefit from "rules
that give them flexibility in reacting to reservations and . . allow them to
reserve judgment as to whether, how, and when reservations may be
opposed,"' 4 that benefit is considerably reduced if non-reserving states have
already tipped their hand by responding (or failing to respond) to earlier
reservations.
On the whole, therefore, there may be a first mover disadvantage to
reserving. All other things being equal, in other words, the value of
reservations to reserving states appears to be smaller (and the informational
and strategic benefits to non-reserving states concomitantly greater) the closer
a reservation is made to the date of the treaty's conclusion and the earlier it is
made relative to the reservations of other states. This claim is consistent with
the finding, noted in Reserving, that latecomers to a treaty make more
reservations than early ratifiers. 5 But it also suggests a broader theoretical
point-that Swaine's claims concerning the informational value of
reservations can profitably be applied not only to non-reserving states, but
also to interested non-member states that are considering whether (and if so,
when) to ratify a treaty.
B. Changing Treaty Commitments and Post-Ratification Reservations
A second set of issues that a dynamic model of reservations highlights is
how states respond to changes in a treaty's obligations or shifts in the
geostrategic context in which it is embedded. For example, an international
13. These disadvantages of early reservations must be weighed against the possibility that
early non-reserving states will be more likely to withhold their objections out of concern that doing so
may cause the state to withdraw its ratification and thus prevent or delay the treaty's entry into force.
14. Swaine, supra note 1, at 345.
15. Id at 342 n.210.
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tribunal authorized to interpret the treaty may adopt an expansive
interpretation of its terms. Or new and unexpected economic or political
shocks may make adherence to existing treaty obligations more onerous.
Changes of this nature can significantly raise the cost of compliance for
one or more treaty parties. States may respond to such increased costs
multilaterally, for example by renegotiating the treaty, amending its
provisions, or issuing an official interpretation to reverse a tribunal's
expansive rulings. But increased compliance costs may also trigger a
unilateral response in which a state denounces the treaty and then re-accedes
to it with a reservation relating to the changed provisions.
This strategy is controversial and its validity under international law is
unsettled. 16 In what is surely the most famous example, Trinidad and Tobago
and Guyana denounced the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant in 1998 and 1999, respectively. The two states then immediately re-
acceded to the Protocol with reservations that precluded defendants on death
row in those two countries from filing petitions with the United Nations
Human Rights Committee. The states adopted this strategy in response to
increasing constraints on their ability to impose capital sentences as a result of
decisions by international tribunals in favor of death row defendants.
17
The reactions of other states parties to this maneuver were
overwhelmingly negative. Eleven European countries-all of which had
abolished capital punishment-filed objections to the substance of the two
reservations and to the procedure by which the two Caribbean nations had
interposed them. 18 France's objection contained the most unequivocal
condemnation, characterizing the denunciation and re-accession as an "abuse
of process" and "a clear violation of the principle of good faith."19 Other
objections ranged from equally disapproving statements to more equivocal
claims that the "correctness of the procedure" was "doubtful"20 or that it "may
set a bad precedent."
2 1
In late 1999, as the European states were filing these objections, the
Human Rights Committee received a petition from a death row inmate against
16. See Comm. of Legal Advisers on Pub. Int'l Law (CAHDI), Practical Issues Regarding
Reservations to International Treaties, 19th mtg., CM (2000) 50, App. 4 (2000), available at
https://wcm.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=348409&Lang=en ("Recently, there have been instances where
States have denounced a treaty to which they had not made reservations with a view to re-acceding to
the treaty with reservations. The [Vienna Convention] has no specific rules covering this situation. The
validity of this action is controversial.").
17. For a more detailed discussion of these events, see Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing
Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against
Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1832 (2002).
18. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Ratifications and Reservations, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/5.htm
[hereinafter Optional Protocol Reservations] (reproducing texts of objections by Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden). Curiously, though the
reservations filed by Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago were virtually identical, only seven states
(Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden) objected to both reservations.
Id.
19. Id.
20. ld. (objection of Spain).
21. Id. (objection of Germany).
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Trinidad and Tobago. The state responded on procedural grounds, arguing that
22its reservation deprived the Committee of jurisdiction to review the petition.
Rejecting this claim, a majority of the Committee concluded that the
substance of the reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Optional Protocol. Far more controversially, it severed the reservation
from Trinidad and Tobago's re-accession to the Protocol, binding the state to
the entire treaty without the benefit of the reservation. Trinidad and Tobago
promptly responded by denouncing the Optional Protocol.23 To date, it has not
rejoined the treaty.
Although European governments opposed the denunciation and re-
accession maneuver by these two Caribbean countries, they have been more
amenable to the procedure when their own treaty commitments are at stake.
24
In 2002, for example, Sweden denounced the Convention on the Reduction of
Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple
Nationality and then re-acceded with a reservation limiting its obligations
25under Chapter II of that treaty. In response to the increased risks of
international terrorism, British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a proposal in
2003 (which he later withdrew) to denounce the European Convention on
Human Rights and then rejoin with a reservation exempting Britain from the
obligation not to deport asylum seekers who pose a threat to national security
26to countries where they could face degrading treatment or punishment. And
Switzerland considered employing the same procedure in the early 1990s in
the wake of an adverse ruling by the European Court of Human Rights
striking its initial reservation to the Convention's fair trial provisions.
27
Denunciation and re-accession presents a difficult issue for Swaine's
theory of reservations. On the one hand, such a maneuver may be nothing
more than a crass attempt to evade legal obligations just at the point when
22. Kennedy v. Trin. & Tobago, Communication No. 845/1999, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (Nov. 2, 1999), reprinted in 2 Human Rights Comm., Annual Report of the
Human Rights Committee for 2000, at 266, U.N. Doc. A/55140 (2000).
23. See Glenn McGrory, Reservations of Virtue? Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago's
Reservation to the First Optional Protocol, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 769, 804-12 (2001).
In contrast to Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana has neither denounced the Optional Protocol nor
withdrawn its reservation, notwithstanding repeated requests by the Human Rights Committee that it do
so. It has, however, refused to comply with the Committee's recommendations in cases involving capital
punishment. See Seventeenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, The
Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies with Respect to Reservations to International Human Rights
Treaties, HRI/MC/2005/5, at 36 (Jun. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Treaty Bodies Reservations Practice].
24. See Council of Europe, Practical Issues Regarding Reservations to International Treaties,
708th Mtg., May 3, 2000, available at http://cm.coe.int/dec2OOO708/a4.htm (recommending a ban on
late reservations but noting that "a number of States have started to explore ways around this
prohibition, by denouncing a treaty and re-ratifying the same treaty while formulating reservations").
25. See Convention on the Reduction of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in
Cases of Multiple Nationality, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Europ. T.S. No. 43 (1963),
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=043&CM=8&DF=
2/19/05&CL=ENG.
26. Joshua Rozenberg, Should Britain Twist Human Rights Law To Meet Its Own Ends?,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 30, 2003, at 21; AlanTravis, Asylum in Britain-You Can't Quit
Treaties, Blair Warned, GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2003, at 11.
27. See JORG POLAKIEWICZ, TREATY-MAKING IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 96 (1999);
Konstantin Korkelia, New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 13 EurR. J. INT'L L. 437, 466 n. 107 (2002).
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they begin to impose real constraints. Even more disturbingly, the procedure
sanctions the unilateral and selective rejection of only those treaty
commitments that the denouncing state disfavors, while leaving the remaining
treaty provisions intact. If widely followed, therefore, denunciation and re-
accession with reservations would undermine the value of treaty bargains in
general and would specifically prejudice non-reserving states that had relied
on the terms of their treaty partners' initial ratification decisions.28
As I explain below, however, several reasons suggest that states will
employ such a maneuver only infrequently. Moreover, in the rare instance
when a state does resort to the procedure, the information about deviance and
reputation that it conveys to non-ratifying states is likely to be different-and
more consequential to non-reserving states-than the information disclosed by
standard reservations.
As an initial matter, the frequency of denunciation and re-accession will
be reduced by the filing of late reservations. Although legal commentators
have frowned on this practice, it is sufficiently common that treaty
depositories have developed different procedures for circulating late
reservations to non-reserving states for their review. 29 The International Law
Commission has recommended allowing late reservations, but only if no other
treaty party objects within a specified period of time (usually twelve
months). 3° According to the Commission's proposal, an objection by even one
other state "destroys" the late reservation and returns the putative reserving
state to its original treaty bargain.3'
The Commission's restrictive proposal-which has the effect of giving
every state a veto over post-ratification reservations-makes sense given the
strategic benefits of reserving late. 32 But the underutilization of objections
generally, and their limited use to block post-ratification reservations in
particular, suggests that late reservations have become a regular, if infrequent,
component of modem treaty practice. 33 Thus, a state that seeks to revise its
treaty commitments unilaterally in response to changed circumstances has at
its disposal a lawful, albeit constrained, mechanism for doing so.
28. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fifty-Third Session, at 481, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter
2001 ILC Report] (stating that "the principle pacta sunt servanda itself.., would be called into question
[if] at any moment a party to a treaty could, by formulating a reservation, call its treaty obligations into
question"); POLAKIEWICz, supra note 27, at 96 ("Denunciation followed by immediate re-ratification
may even constitute an abuse of rights."). But see Mads Andenas & David Spivack, The U.N. Drug
Conventions Regime and Policy Reform 6 (Legal Opinion Prepared by the British Inst. of Int'l and
Comp. Law, 2003), available at http://www.senliscouncil.net/ documents/BIICL.-opinion ("There is
nothing to prevent a party from denunciating (withdrawing) and then reacceding solely for the purpose
of making a reservation which it did not make originally, and which it was then too late to make.").
29. See ANTHoNY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRAncICE 129-30 (2000) (noting the
phenomenon of late reservations and response by the U.N. Secretary General); 2001 ILC Report, supra
note 28, at 482-85 (discussing examples of the filing of late reservations and responses by treaty
depositories).
30. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 28, at 477-95.
31. Id. at 494.
32. See supra Part lI.A.
33. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 28, at 482-86 (discussing examples of late reservations
to which no other state objected).
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Where, however, a late reservation is blocked or an objection is
anticipated, a state seeking to restrict its treaty obligations ex post must
consider whether to adopt the legally and politically riskier strategy of
formally leaving the treaty and rejoining it with a new reservation. 34
Surprisingly, the Commission's report does not address the legality of this
procedure, although it quotes favorably from a commentator who accepts its
validity.35 However, even if the practice is lawful, it is unlikely to be utilized
very frequently.
First, the reputational harm to a state that denounces and re-accedes to a
treaty will be significant. The denunciations by Trinidad and Tobago and
Guyana, for example, produced a rare instance of multiple common objections
to a reservation. Reputational concerns also led Tony Blair to withdraw his
proposal to denounce and re-ratify the European Convention on Human
Rights.36 Australia's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties reached a similar
conclusion after holding hearings on the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CROC).37 A majority of submissions favored denouncing the CROC to
allow Australia to re-accede with reservations covering the "concept of the
autonomous child., 38 The Committee rejected this approach on the grounds
that it "would do significant harm to Australia's international reputation.,
39
Given these high reputational costs, those few withdrawals and re-
accessions that do occur are likely to reflect fundamental clashes between the
national interests of denouncing-reserving states and specific treaty
provisions-often provisions that have evolved in unexpected ways or that
create strong domestic frictions. Allowing states to interpose reservations to
these clauses, even after ratification, generates valuable information about the
nature of these conflicts. For example, in a dissenting statement to the report
on the CROC, three members of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
recommended that Australia denounce the CROC and re-accede with
reservations. The purpose for doing so was to "alert the international
community to the genuine concerns which the Australian people have with the
CROC." 4 Such statements can also signal the state's propensity to violate the
treaty if the reservation is not adopted, violations that might otherwise go
unobserved, especially in treaty systems with weak monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms.
34. This assumes, of course, that the treaty expressly or implicitly authorizes denunciation or
withdrawal. See Heifer, supra note 5, at 1592-95 (discussing treaties that foreclose exit options).
35. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 28, at 482 ("A party remains always at liberty to accede
anew to the same treaty, this time by proposing certain reservations.") (quoting FRANK HORN,
RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 43 (1988)).
36. See Liberty, Joint Opinion in the Matter of Denunciation of the European Convention on
Human Rights 2-3 (Jan. 2003), http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uktissues/pdfs/pannick-opinion-art-
3.pdf; Rozenberg, supra note 26, at 21; Travis, supra note 26, at 11.
37. THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., JOINT STANDING COMM. ON
TREATIES, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 17TH REPORT
(1998), available at http://www.aph.gov.aulhouse/committeeljsct/reports/reportl7/reptl7ex.pdf.
38. Id. at 6; see also id. at 65.
39. Id at 66.
40. Id. at 71.
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Once made aware of these problems, other treaty parties may respond in
a variety of ways. They may renegotiate the agreement.4 1 They may employ
intra-treaty or extra-treaty influence mechanisms-such as side payments or
sanctions-to induce or coerce the state to adhere to its initial treaty bargain.
And in extreme cases, non-reserving states may exercise the "nuclear option"
of preventing the re-ratified treaty from entering into force between
themselves and the reserving state.42
For all of these reasons, Swaine's information-based theory of
reservations suggests that a categorical ban on denunciation and re-accession
with reservations would be unwise. Such a ban would, as in the case of
Trinidad and Tobago, force states with strongly held objections to specific
treaty rules to quit a treaty even when all states (and perhaps nonstate actors as
well) would be better off had the withdrawing state remained as a party.43 It
would also remove a mechanism for reserving states to convey valuable and
credible information to other parties regarding the nature and intensity of their
objections to changed treaty commitments or changes in the state of the world
that have rendered existing treaty rules problematic or inapposite.
m. BARGAINING AROUND THE VIENNA CONVENTION'S DEFAULT RULES
Reserving focuses its analytical lens on the reservations rules in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As Swaine makes clear, however,
states are free to negotiate around these default rules. The alternatives they
choose range from a prohibition on reservations to affirmatively permitting
reservations, either to the entire treaty or to a select number of its provisions.
States can also bargain around the "object and purpose" test for assessing the
validity of reservations, for example by specifying a different substantive
standard or providing that reservations will be reviewed by an international
tribunal. Whether or not a treaty departs from the Vienna Convention's default
rules on reservations, its drafters can also employ other flexibility devices-
such as declarations, phase-in provisions, derogations, optional clauses, and
amendment procedures-to manage the risks of international agreement. 44
Given this broad freedom of international contract, it is useful to consider how
Swaine's information-based theory applies to these tailored reservations rules
and other risk management provisions.
Swaine considers the alternatives to reservations in his discussion of
"package deal" treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
41. Id. at 72 (advocating, in connection with denunciation and re-accession, that Australia
"agitate for substantial amendments to the CROC to clearly spell out the pre-eminent role of the family
and the rejection of the 'autonomous child' concept").
42. In the case of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, however, none of the objecting countries
chose this option. See Optional Protocol Reservations, supra note 18.
43. See McGrory, supra note 23, at 815 n.215 (criticizing Human Rights Committee's
rejection of Trinidad and Tobago's re-accession reservation on the ground that "it is difficult to justify
an 'all or nothing' policy, which in practice eliminates the right of appeal for citizens of Trinidad and
Tobago who are not under sentence of death").
44. For a comprehensive list of these risk management rules, see BILDER, supra note 4, at ix-
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Court (ICC), and the WTO Agreement, each of which precludes
reservations. 45 His plausible supposition is that such agreements-in which
states "horse trade" their preferred legal rules into a unified package of
obligations-may enhance treaty depth without the need for reservations. Yet
Swaine is ultimately dubious of the utility of such omnibus agreements, using
examples from UNCLOS to suggest that that the treaty's no reservations rule
may have prolonged negotiations, watered down obligations, and ultimately
proved ineffective, inasmuch as the convention did not bar states from filing
interpretive declarations. 46 He is similarly skeptical of treaty-specific
modifications to the Vienna Convention's default rules and of alternatives to
reservations in general, opining that "[s]uch workarounds are not explored at
the rate one would expect if states were intent on protecting negotiated treaty
terms, and their form is often even more disappointing.
The empirical accuracy of these assertions is uncertain, however. Swaine
cites considerable anecdotal evidence to support his claims. But there is
equally persuasive evidence to the contrary.
With respect to treaty-specific reservations rules, a leading study of
European treaty-making states that "the drafting practice within the Council of
Europe clearly favours a system of 'negotiated reservations"' in which treaties
"exhaustively enumerate the provisions" to which a state may reserve and on
what terms.48 Consider as well the Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties
Handbook,49 a reference tool published by the United Nations Office of Legal
Affairs to assist governments in drafting multilateral agreements. 50 The
Handbook's section on reservations reviews the full spectrum of alternatives
to the Vienna Convention's default rules, illustrates them with citations to
existing treaties in force, and discusses the frequency of their use.
51
There is also compelling evidence that states eschew reservations
altogether in certain issue areas. For example the Handbook states that
"[t]reaties in the environmental field often prohibit reservations," and that a
similar ban applies to all 185 conventions adopted by the International Labor
Organization (ILO). 52 The ILO Secretariat-which plays an active role in
treaty-making within the organization-has consistently taken the position
that reservations are inconsistent with the ILO's tripartite membership
45. See Swaine, supra note 1, at 333 & n.151.
46. See id. at 332-33.
47. See id. at 325 (footnote omitted).
48. PoLAKIEwIcz, supra note 27, at 85.
49. U.N. OFFCE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, FINAL CLAUSES OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES
HANDBOOK, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003).
50. The Handbook describes final clauses as encompassing "articles on the settlement of
disputes, amendment and review, the status of annexes, signature, ratification, accession, entry into
force, withdrawal and termination, reservations, designation of the depositary, and authentic texts." Such
clauses also include provisions that "address the relationship of the treaty to other treaties, its duration,
provisional application, territorial application, and registration." Id. at 1.
51. Id. at 44-50.
52. Id at 47.
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structure that includes not only governments, but also workers and
employers.53
In place of reservations, multilateral agreements in the environment and
labor fields offer a rich array of flexibility devices and risk management tools.
For treaties that protect the global environment, a principal concern is enticing
developing countries to ratify and incur the often substantial costs associated
with reducing environmental harms. To encourage ratification by these states,
many environmental agreements adopt "differential treatment" rules that take
account of disparities in resource endowments and capacities in allocating the
distribution of treaty burdens and treaty benefits. 54 Agreements as diverse as
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the
Convention to Combat Desertification all contain provisions that
"discriminate among states with regard to core obligations, giving developing
countries less stringent commitments . . . postponing their obligations," or
absolving them legal responsibilities altogether. 55 Recent scholarship has
emphasized that these differential treatment rules function as multilateral
alternatives to unilateral reservations, cabining developing countries'
discretion to cherry-pick which treaty provisions to accept.
56
In the international labor regime, the ILO Secretariat has promoted a
broad array of flexibility mechanisms to customize treaties to economically
and geographically disparate workplace conditions and to the needs of
countries at different stages of development. Some ILO conventions, for
example, identify standards that apply only to specifically designated states.
Others contain general principles and relegate more detailed rules to
nonbinding recommendations on the same topic. Still other labor treaties
permit ratification in parts (with or without "escalator clauses" that require
acceptance of additional commitments over time) or allow states to exclude
designated industries or specific categories of workers. 57 These diverse
mechanisms help states to manage risk and tailor their legal obligations in
much the same way as do unilateral reservations.
These examples from environmental protection and labor treaties are
merely illustrative. A more complete picture of when and how treaty
negotiators bargain around the Vienna Convention's reservations default rules
requires a comprehensive empirical analysis. 58 But the examples discussed
53. See J.F. McMahon, The Legislative Technique of the International Labour Organization,
41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 77-85 (1965-66) (discussing history of and rationales for ban on reservations).
54. See PHILIPPE CULLET, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL
LAw (2003); ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEvELOPING CouNTRIES (1999); LAVANYA
RAjAMAm, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENviRoNMENTAL LAW (2006).
55. HALVORSSEN, supra note 54, at 87; see also id. at 87-98 (reviewing differential treatment
provisions in international environmental agreements).
56. See RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 7.
57. See NICOLAS VALTICOS & GERALD W. VON POTOBSKY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAw 55-
60 (1995); J.M. Servais, Flexibility and Rigidity in International Labour Standards, 125 INT'L LAB.
REV. 193 (1986).
58. Barbara Koremenos has created a new data set, the Continent of International Law
(COIL), to undertake such a comprehensive analysis. See Koremenos, supra note 8, at 554.
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above do suggest some intriguing extensions of Swaine's theory of how both
reserving and non-reserving states benefit from reservations.
First, treaty negotiators can use tailored reservations rules and other
flexibility devices to enhance treaty breadth and depth. As with the Vienna
Convention's off-the-rack reservation regime, the relationship to breadth of
membership is easier to identify. By indicating which treaty clauses are
reservable, by specifying the types of reservations that are permitted, or by
substituting or supplementing reservations with other flexibility tools,
negotiators can make treaties politically palatable to a larger number of
countries.
These flexibility devices can also deepen treaty commitments, although
the effect likely varies with the specific design tool that negotiators choose.
For example, treaty clauses that permit temporary derogations act as an
insurance policy that reduces uncertainty by providing a regulated procedure
for deviation if certain exceptional conditions later arise. With the risks of
future cooperation reduced, states can commit to more expansive treat
obligations than they would have accepted without these "escape clauses." 9
Permissive denunciation clauses, finite duration provisions, mandatory
renegotiation clauses, and treaty-specific reservations rules may have similar
depth-enhancing effects.6°
Unlike the default rule for reservations, however, these risk management
tools may have very different consequences for the disclosure of information
to other states. Consider first treaties that adopt distinctive standards or
procedures for formulating or evaluating reservations. These particularized
rules may not only narrow options for reserving states; they may also reduce
the discretion of non-reserving states to choose how to respond to
reservations. Tailored reservations rules-particularly those relating to
objections-may thus limit the power of non-reserving states to shift the
control of treaty risks away from reserving states, undermining the principal
benefit to those states that Swaine identifies.
61
Other flexibility devices may have different information effects. Devices
that require states to make an affirmative statement-such as declarations,
derogations, and optional clauses or protocols-will generate useful
information for other treaty parties. For example, a state that files a
declaration recognizing a treaty body's competence to receive individual
petitions signals a more serious commitment to protecting human rights than a
state that eschews this optional review mechanism.62 By contrast, flexibility
provisions that apply automatically to all treaty parties or to predetermined
categories of states-such as differential treatment rules, finite duration
59. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguarde": A Positive Analysis of the GAT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 255,279 (1991).
60. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 5, at 1637; Koremenos, supra note 8, at 549; Barbara
Koremenos, Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 INT'L ORG.
289, 289-92 (2001).
61. See Swaine, supra note 1, at 362-63.
62. See Oona A. Hathway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821, 1845 (2003)
(analyzing compliance records of states that accept optional complaint mechanisms in human rights
treaties).
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provisions, and ratification in parts-will generate little or no country-specific
information, even if they are highly effective in increasing membership or
enhancing the depth of treaty commitments generally.
The foregoing discussion suggests the need for more rigorous analysis of
the relationships among reservations and other flexibility provisions, and in
particular, of how different design choices affect the production of
information. I consider one such relationship below. But the broader and
underappreciated theoretical point is that negotiators may be able to improve
treaty design (and perhaps even treaty performance) by selecting flexibility
devices that are roughly equivalent in their effects on breadth or depth, but
that have very different informational effects.
IV. LINKING TREATY ENTRY AND EXIT: THE RELATIONSHIP OF
RESERVATIONS TO DENUNCIATIONS
Treaty provisions that permit reservations do not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, they operate in tandem with other flexibility devices that treaty makers
use to address the pervasive risks and uncertainties of international affairs.
Those who seek to reform the rules and institutions that comprise the
international reservations regime need to take into account this broader design
context. They must recognize, for example, that selecting rules to police the
unilateral conditions states impose when they enter into treaties cannot be
dissociated from the rules governing whether states may later leave those
treaties. Considering the link between conditional acceptance of treaty
obligations ex ante and restrictions on withdrawal from those obligations ex
post helps to resolve a contentious and unsettled question of reservations
law-the consequences for a state that ratifies a treaty with a reservation later
determined to be invalid.
Reserving considers these consequences when reviewing the practice of
treaty bodies and international tribunals that claim the power to decide
whether reservations are compatible with the treaties they supervise." Where
international jurists or review bodies conclude that a reservation is invalid,
three alternatives are possible. First, the state's ratification may be nullified
(and its treaty membership terminated) absent a clear indication of its intent to
adhere to the treaty without the reservation. Second, the state may be
considered a party to the treaty except for the clauses to which its invalid
reservation applied. Third and most controversially, the reservation may be
severed. Under this approach, the state is deemed a party to the treaty in its
entirety, including the provisions covered by its now stricken reservation.
64
Swaine portrays an unsettled legal landscape regarding these
alternatives. He relates the U.N. Human Rights Committee's position that
invalid reservations are presumptively severable, and the strident opposition to
that approach by several powerful nations, including the United States. As a
result of these divergences, Swaine identifies a "lack of specificity as to when
63. See Swaine, supra note 1, at 321-23.
64. For a comprehensive discussion of these alternatives, see Goodman, supra note 11.
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a reservation will be deemed severable, and [an] ambiguity concerning a
treaty body's final authority in any such determination."65 He concludes on a
cautionary note, arguing that giving treaty bodies the authority to sever
incompatible reservations "risk[s] weakening treaty terms, driving
reservations underground without increasing compliance, and diminishing the
willingness of states to ratify."66
Swaine's concerns about the ancillary effects of severability on other
aspects of treaty design are well taken. The rules that govern the validity of
reservations do not operate in isolation. They function in tandem with a
treaty's substantive provisions and its risk management tools to create an
overall level of commitment for states parties.67 To answer the question of
whether a particular incompatible reservation should be severed, for example,
it is also necessary to consider the provisions that control whether a reserving
state can "exit" from the treaty.
68
Analyzing reservations together with denunciations helps to clarify
whether the remedy of severance is appropriate. In the case of treaties that
prohibit denunciation, 69 the costs of making the wrong severability decision
are quite high. If a treaty body's decision to sever is erroneous-that is, if the
reservation was in fact a condition of the state's consent to be bound-holding
the state to the entire treaty without the benefit of the reservation binds the
state to obligations to which it expressly declined to consent and from which it
may not lawfully withdraw. Such an outcome is not only harmful to the
reserving nation. It also harms non-reserving states, since the treaty system as
a whole may see higher rates of noncompliance by states that are now at least
partially unwilling members. By contrast, where a treaty permits denunciation,
the error costs of an erroneous severability decision are lower and a
presumption of severability is far more defensible. If a stricken reservation is
in fact essential to a state's ratification, the state can correct the tribunal's
mistaken decision to sever by invoking the treaty's denunciation clause, as
65. Swaine, supra note 1, at 322-23. Commentators also dispute the relative merits of the
three approaches. Until recently, most observers favored either the first or second test. Scholars
advocating the third approach have argued, however, that because states have an incentive to over-
reserve, an invalid reservation should be presumed to be severable, leaving the state bound to the entire
treaty. See Goodman, supra note 11, at 537 (identifying the incentives for a state to "include more
reservations than required to obtain its consent").
66. Swaine, supra note 1, at 363-64.
67. See Raustiala, supra note 10, at 582 ("We cannot understand the form or substance of an
international accord in isolation because the connections between the various elements shape empirical
outcomes.").
68. See Helfer, supra note 5, at 1640-42.
69. Four major human rights agreements do not contain denunciation or withdrawal clauses.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Second
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642
U.N.T.S. 414. Under the prevailing interpretation of the Vienna Convention, states are precluded from
withdrawing from these treaties. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., 53d Sess., General Comments Under
Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment
No. 26(61), at 102, 1-5, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998), available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIMi
CaseLaw/Gen_Com.nsf/3b4ae2c98fe8b54dc12568870055fbbd/3a83e429348190f2c125688700532c38?
OpenDocument (concluding that it is not possible to denounce the ICCPR).
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Trinidad and Tobago did after the U.N. Human Rights Committee severed its
death penalty reservation to the First Optional Protocol.70
This insight also has implications for the disclosure of information. In
treaty regimes that follow a presumptive severability rule but in which no
possibility of withdrawal exists, states may seek to ward off severance by
asserting that each and every clause in their reservations is an essential
condition of their ratification. Such overclaiming as to the strength of a state's
preference for reserving may distort whether and in what form non-reserving
states object to their reservations, diminishing their discretion to decide
"whether, how, and when reservations may be opposed. By contrast,
tribunals or treaty bodies that sever invalid reservations to treaties from which
exit is possible may trigger an increase in denunciations, perhaps followed by
re-accession with a new reservation that is expressly conditional.72 Or, seeking
to avoid either of these outcomes, treaty bodies may initiate a new form of
"reservations dialogue ' 73 with government officials to determine whether a
particular reservation-perhaps one filed many years earlier-is in fact a
condition of the state's consent to be bound by the treaty.74
V. CONCLUSION
The positive theory of state interests developed in Reserving helps to
answer many doctrinal questions that have long preoccupied legal scholars
and policymakers. It also provides a useful metric against which to assess
proposals to reform existing reservations rules. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, Swaine argues that those rules serve the interests of non-reserving
states in generating useful information about reserving states' reputation and
propensity to comply with treaties. Reform proposals that limit or distort this
information-forcing function should therefore be viewed with skepticism.
In this Response, I have used Swaine's insightful contribution to the
interdisciplinary literature on treaty design to make three points. First, I have
applied his theory of state interests and information to a dynamic model that
considers the timing of reservations and the evolution of treaty obligations.
Second, I have discussed how treaty breadth, treaty depth, and information
vary when states bargain around the Vienna Convention's reservations default
rules to select alternative flexibility devices. Third and finally, I have
considered the link between reservations and denunciations and its
consequences for deciding whether an invalid reservation should be severed
from a state's ratification. Extending Reserving to these three issues suggests
fruitful areas of future research for scholars interested in how states use legal
70. See Helfer, supra note 17, at 1881.
71. Swaine, supra note 1, at 345.
72. See supra Part II.B.
73. Swaine, supra note 1, at 360.
74. See Treaty Bodies Reservations Practice, supra note 23, at 18 (discussing proposal that
treaty bodies ask governments, during their review of state reports, "what their choice would be between
remaining a party to the treaty without each reservation and denouncing it") (internal quotations
omitted).
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rules and institutions to generate information and to optimize the benefits of
international cooperation.
